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SOFT INFORMATION AND THE STEWARDSHIP










In the light of IASB’s statement to drop stewardship as a separate objective of financial accounting and the
ongoing debate about increasing the disclosure of soft information, we investigate the economic consequences
of publicly reported soft information from a stewardship perspective.  In a LEN model we include market
price as a performance measure and investigate whether the principal benefits from disclosing additional
information.  While the principal can only use contractible performance measures in the contract with the
agent, capital market participants can only use disclosed information when pricing firm value.  We find that
the disclosure of information can decrease the principal’s expected net profit.  This result follows from either
a noisier or a less congruent market price as a consequence of disclosing additional information.  Thus, we
present a rationale for partial disclosure in the absence of proprietary costs or the uncertainty of information
endowment.
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1 Examples refer to the introduction of the “soft harbor rule” in 1979 and its reform in 1995, which both tried to encourage
the disclosure of forward looking information, Seamons and Rouse (1997).
2 Similarly, Petersen (2004, 2) defines soft information as “information which is difficult to completely summarize in a
numeric score.”
1. INTRODUCTION
Standard setters and regulators justify reporting and disclosure requirements by the demand of capital owners
for decision-useful information (O’Connell 2007, 217).  Following the argumentation applied by FASB and
IASB, a greater volume of timely information enhances market efficiency and decreases the cost of capital.
More recently, regulators require firms to increase the disclosure of soft information.1  Soft information
“includes less certain information known to an issuer, such as projections and other forward-looking
information” (SEC Commissioner R.Y. Roberts 1994).  More generally, we define soft information as
information that cannot be verified and, thus, cannot be used in a contract between two parties (i.e., the
information is non-contractible).2  This definition covers such diverse examples as information on sales
forecasts, the progress of an investment project (Choi, Kristiansen and Nahm 2007), management reputation
(Stocken and Verrecchia 1999), and the closeness of the relation between a firm and its bank (Liberti 2003).
We argue that, while disclosing information to investors may improve market price informativeness, it
can be detrimental to firm owners from a stewardship perspective.  More specifically, we identify conditions
under which the value of publicly reported information is negative.  Key to the negative value is the dilution
of managerial incentives as a consequence of a noisier and less congruent market price that results when the
disclosed information is impounded in the price.  Therefore, gains in price informativeness come at the
expense of firm value.
Disclosure of soft information is pervasive.  For example, Tsao (2002) notes that “a company’s own
filings to the Securities & Exchange Commission are filled with revealing information about prospects for
sales and profits.”  Empirical evidence suggests that soft information in earnings announcements is value
relevant (Davis, Piger and Sedor 2007) and affects price volatility (Demers and Vega 2008).  Besides firm
disclosures, analysts’ reports and press-related statements release further soft information to investors
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3  This statement hinges on the contracting usefulness of soft information.  Whereas, e.g., information on the success of
an in-house training program or the success of implementing a new software are straightforward examples of useful signals, forward-
looking information can be useful as well.  Even though participants in an agency would most likely not want to sign a contract on
pure expectations, prospective information often contains information about past performance.  For example,
Information that may be informative about the manager’s effort, but that may not be contractible, includes information
about the relative performance of the firm within the industry and information about the manager’s reputation. (Stocken
and Verrecchia 1999)
Likewise,
... analysts can help interpret the implication of a newly announced technology development for future performance; and
corporate disclosures can provide facts and explanations to confirm or deny speculations, predictions, and forecasts made
by analysts. (Chen, Cheng and Lo 2006, 2)
(Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky and Macskassy 2008).  
Understanding the stewardship value of accounting disclosures is important because regulators frequently
presume complementarity between stewardship and decision-usefulness.  For example, the IASB recently
announced that “... the Board agreed that stewardship or accountability should not be a separate objective of
financial reporting by business entities in the converged framework” (IASB 2005, para. 24).  More
specifically, the IASB claims that “financial information directed at the primary objective of providing
information useful for investment [...] is useful for other purposes, including assessing management’s
stewardship”  (IASB 2005, para. 24).  Bushman, Engel and Smith (2006) provide supportive evidence for this
claim.  On the contrary, theoretical analysis by Gjesdal (1981), Paul (1992), and Feltham and Xie (1994)
emphasizes potential conflicts between stewardship and decision-usefulness; e.g., Gassen (2008) provides
supportive evidence for this view.  By identifying conditions where extensive mandatory disclosure of soft
information destroys firm value, our study yields important insights to the regulator.
Given that market price aggregates any information available to investors, by using market price as a
performance measure in the contract with the manager, firm owners are able to indirectly contract on
otherwise non-contractible information (Bushman and Indjejikian 1993).3  In situations where the accounting
system internally generates soft information (e.g., a report that compiles “soft facts” that may be important
to investment decisions or projections that are necessary when preparing financial statements), this result
suggests that it can be beneficial for firm owners to publicly report this soft information (e.g., by including
the information in the management report).  However, it is unclear at this point whether firm owners should
disclose the entire amount or merely a subset of the soft information.  In this regard, our results shed light on
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4 Hayes and Schaefer (2000) provide empirical evidence that supports the hypothesis that firms’ contracts include
performance measures that are only observable by the contracting parties and that these measures are informative about the firm’s
future prospects.
optimal firm-level disclosure policy.  
This study first contributes to the discussion on the economic consequences of mandatory disclosure.
In particular, we address the disclosure of soft information and identify the incremental stewardship value
of varying the quantity of publicly reported information.  By identifying conditions under which a larger
quantity of disclosed information yields a negative value, we establish that increasing mandatory disclosure
of soft information can decrease firm value.  Secondly, we present a rationale for the firm not to follow a full-
disclosure strategy but rather to commit ex ante to withhold some information from capital market
participants.  More specifically, given that soft information is available to investors from other sources outside
the firm, there exist conditions where it is beneficial to not disclose supplemental (hard or soft) information.
In this respect, the study contributes to the discussion on voluntary disclosure.  The study also contributes
to the ongoing discussion on the relation of stewardship and decision-usefulness.  In particular, our results
support the opponents of the IASB’s proposal to drop stewardship as a separate objective of financial
accounting.
In our analysis, an agent performs multiple tasks and is evaluated using multiple performance measures.
While we only consider performance measures that are (conditionally) informative about the agent’s actions,
only a subset of these signals can be used by the principal in the contract with the agent (i.e., only a subset
of the generated signals is contractible information).  In addition, a subset of the generated signals is publicly
reported to capital market participants4 who use all information available (including non-contractible
information) to form expectations about firm value.  In the model, the gross market price is equal to investors’
expectation about the firm’s terminal payoff conditional on the available information and their beliefs about
the actions selected by the agent.  To simplify the analysis, we assume the principal is risk neutral, the agent
has exponential utility and quadratic effort cost, the performance measures are normally distributed, and the
compensation contract is restricted to be a linear function of the contractible performance measures, including
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5 Core, Guay and Verrecchia (2003) and Leone, Wu and Zimmerman (2006) provide empirical evidence suggesting that
managerial contracts include both accounting information (e.g., annual earnings) and market price as performance measures.
6 In this regard, we neglect differences between mandatory and voluntary disclosure regimes.  We thank Stefan Reichelstein
for pointing out this issue.
market price.5  We determine the value of publicly reported (supplemental) information by comparing the
expected net payoff to the principal under two information systems; the information systems differ regarding
the disclosure of a single performance measure.  This disclosure value is used to assess the economic
consequences of increasing mandatory requirements regarding the disclosure of soft information and to
investigate the firm’s decision to voluntarily disclose information.6
Our results indicate that the disclosure value depends on the type of information that is to be disclosed
(i.e., whether it is contractible or non-contractible information) and the amount and type of information
already available to the investors.  For example, the principal is, in general, indifferent regarding the
disclosure of contractible information if investors have only contractible information plus no more than a
single non-contractible signal.  However, the principal can have strict preferences regarding the disclosure
of contractible information if investors receive multiple non-contractible signals.  Likewise, the principal
weakly benefits from a publicly reported non-contractible performance measure if this signal is the only non-
contractible information released to the investors.  However, given that the investors receive non-contractible
information (e.g., from analysts), the principal can be strictly worse off if she discloses a supplemental non-
contractible signal.
Key to a potentially negative disclosure value is that investors’ aggregation of information for pricing
purposes differs from the aggregation that is optimal for the incentive contract with the agent (Paul 1992,
Feltham and Xie 1994) and that the non-contractibility of information prevents the principal from adjusting
and undoing investor aggregation.  The difference in aggregation yields two reasons for a detrimental effect
of disclosure on the principal’s expected net payoff.  First, while the impact of more disclosure on the
sensitivity of price to the agent’s action is ambiguous, disclosing more information weakly increases price
volatility.  Intuitively, the principal is worse off if disclosure yields a smaller signal-to-noise ratio.  Secondly,
disclosure can reduce the congruity of market price relative to the firm’s terminal value, yielding a less
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7 Chen et al. (2006) observe that investors’ reliance on other sources of information varies with corporate disclosure.
efficient effort allocation across tasks.  In particular, non-congruity increases if, e.g., relative to the firm’s
terminal value, the supplemental information is less congruent than the initial information.  Importantly,
disclosing contractible information affects the weights assigned by investors to the available information
(including the weights assigned to the non-contractible information)7 and may result in a smaller signal-to-
noise ratio or a less congruent market price.  Due to the non-contractibility of some of the information that
is available to the investors, the principal is unable to undo any changes to the investors’ aggregation of
information into price that are induced by the disclosed information.  Thus, the divergence in the preferences
regarding the aggregation of the performance measures combined with the non-contractibility of disclosed
signals causes the negative disclosure value.
Several implications follow from our findings.  First, our results are in stark contrast to the commonly
held view that the usefulness of market price as a performance measure increases with the degree to which
it measures firm value.  For example, according to Healy and Palepu (2001, 422) “stock compensation is more
likely to be an efficient form of remuneration for managers and owners if stock prices are a precise estimate
of firm values.”  Secondly, our results emphasize that the value of publicly reported soft information crucially
depends on the magnitude of soft information already available to investors.  Then, depending on the type
of incentive problem faced by firm owners, changes in mandatory disclosure requirements for soft and hard
information can leave some firms worse off.  Finally, non-verifiable soft information is presumably more
sensitive to unproductive actions as compared with hard (accounting) information.  Then, disclosing (more)
soft information reduces the congruency of market price, relative to firm value.  While investors in their
pricing can factor out the impact of window dressing activities on their expectations of future firm value,
managers will nevertheless be motivated to exert window dressing effort (Fischer and Verrecchia 2000).
Assuming that earnings management is a proxy for the management of soft information, we expect to observe
a positive relation between the disclosure of soft information and the extent of earnings management.  
Regarding prior work on disclosure and incentive contracting, our work is most closely related to that
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of Feltham and Xie (1994), Bushman and Indjejikian (1993), and Christensen and Feltham (2000).  While
Feltham and Xie (1994) establish a non-negative value of additional performance measures in a multi-task
setting, we find that disclosing additional contractible and non-contractible performance measures can have
a negative value.  Bushman and Indjejikian (1993) assume that market price includes private information to
investors, and that increased disclosure can reduce investors’ incentives to privately acquire information.
Hence, similar to our result, increased disclosure can have a negative value in their setting.  Different to our
focus on the disclosure of ex post-information, Christensen and Feltham (2000) consider incentives to
motivate the agent to disclose pre-decision information.  Finally, our result that accounting information and
stock price are only used simultaneously if stock price contains non-contractible information about the agent’s
action is consistent with Baiman and Verrecchia (1995).
Our work is also related to the literature on reasons for partial disclosure.  In addition to explanations
based on, e.g., the proprietary nature of superior information (Verrecchia 1983), uncertainty about the
existence of information (Dye 1985), and uncertainty about the type of information (Teoh and Kwan 1991),
our results indicate that the concurrent usage of information to address managerial incentive problems can
provide a complementary rationale for partial disclosure.  While the literature on partial disclosure usually
discusses the ex post decision to disclose information (i.e., after the information is generated), Guay and
Verrecchia (2007) show that it is valuable for the firm to commit ex ante to a full disclosure strategy if the
goal is a high stock price.  To the contrary, our results indicate that it can be optimal to commit ex ante to a
partial disclosure strategy if the objective is to provide efficient incentives to a manager; it is straightforward
that this increase in efficiency will also lead to a higher expected stock price in equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we present the basic model, discuss
investors’ pricing, and derive optimal contracts when (i) the principal uses market price as the sole
performance measure, (ii) the principal uses all contractible performance measures except market price in the
contract with the agent, and (iii) the principal uses all contractible performance measures plus market price
in the contract with the agent.  In Section 3, we determine the value of publicly reported performance
measures.  In Subsection 3.1, the principal discloses a single performance measure (e.g., manager’s
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8 Alternatively, x may also represent the firm’s future market price.  We choose the term payoff to distinguish market price
at date 2 from firm value.
9 Without loss in generality, we neglect undisclosed soft information.  Signals including this type of information can neither
be used by the principal in the contract with the agent nor by investors when updating their beliefs about the terminal payoff.
reputation).  Subsections 3.2 and 3.3 consider the disclosure of supplemental non-contractible information
(e.g., the success of adopting a new software) in a single- and multi-task setting.  Finally, Subsection 3.4
analyzes disclosure value of contractible information, given that the investors also receive non-contractible
information.  Conclusions are presented in Section 4.
2. BASIC NOTATION AND MODEL STRUCTURE
2.1 Agent’s Actions, Performance Measures, and Price Formation
At date 0, the principal, acting on behalf of the firm’s long term risk neutral owners, hires an agent to provide
effort at date 1 in return for compensation at date 2.  The agent expends costly effort in n tasks that influence
the payoff to the principal, and his choice of effort levels is represented by the vector a 0 ún.  We assume a
linear relation between effort and the firm’s terminal payoff8, i.e.,
x ' bNa % gx,
where b 0 ún represents the productivity of the agent’s tasks and gx ~ N(0, σx2) represents random events
beyond the agent’s control.  The agent’s personal cost of effort κ(a) is assumed to be
κ(a) ' ½ aNa.
At date 2, information system η generates performance measures and releases these signals to the
principal and to investors.  Performance measures are either publicly reported to investors (i.e., public
performance measures) or undisclosed and only released to the principal (i.e., “internal” performance
measures).  In addition, the information is either contractible (i.e., hard) or non-contractible (i.e., soft).
Applying both classifications, we distinguish between mh public performance measures of hard information
(denoted by the mh×1 vector yh), ms public measures of soft information (denoted by the ms×1 vector ys) and
mu undisclosed performance measures of hard information (denoted by the mu×1 vector yu).9  We assume a
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10 The signals that are made public are disclosed without additional error.  This assumption is common in the literature on
discretionary disclosure, where disclosure is often assumed to be truthful.  For a review of this literature see Verrecchia (2001).
11 Similarly, we can write Σp ' ρpρpNσx2 % Σμp.
linear relation between effort and performance, i.e.,
yi ' Mi a % gi, i ' h, s, u,
where the mi×n matrix Mi represents the sensitivities of the mi performance measures to the agent’s effort
levels in his n tasks, gi is a mi×1 vector of normally distributed noise terms with gi ~ N(0,Σi) and mi×mi
covariance matrix Σi.  Moreover, Σij / Cov[gi,gj], i,j ' h, s, u and i…j.  The noise of each performance measure
reflects uncontrollable events that affect the firm’s payoff plus inaccuracy of the accounting system (i.e.,
measurement error).  Specifically, the noise is assumed to be
gi ' gx ρi % gμi, i ' h, s, u,
where the mi×1 vector ρi characterizes the correlation of the performance measures to the output, and the mi×1
vector gμi represents measurement error, with gμi ~ N(0,Σμi), Σμi is the mi×mi covariance matrix of the
measurement-related noise terms, and Cov[gx,gμi] ' 0.  Thus Σi ' ρiρiNσx2 % Σμi, i ' h, s, u, where ρiρiNσx2 is
the mi×mi covariance matrix of the output-related noise inherent in the performance measures.
The investors can only use public information to infer the firm’s terminal value.10  Likewise, the principal
can only use contractible information in the agent’s contract.  More specifically, the investors use yp '
(yhN,ysN)N for price setting, and the principal may use yc ' (yhN,yuN)N in the agent’s contract.  Then,
yl ' Ml a % gl, l ' p, c,
where the mp×n matrix Mp represents the sensitivities of the mp'mh%ms public performance measures to the
agent’s effort levels, the mc×n matrix Mc represents the sensitivities of the mc'mh%mu contractible
performance measures to the agent’s effort levels, and gl is an ml×1 vector of normally distributed noise terms
with gl ~ N(0,Σl) and ml×ml covariance matrix Σl.  The sensitivity and covariance matrices are given by the
respective matrices for public and private performance measures on hard and soft information.  In particular,
ρp ' (ρhN,ρsN)N characterizes the correlation of the publicly reported performance measures with the firm’s
terminal payoff.11
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12 This setting is equivalent to Feltham and Xie (1994) and similar to the market maker’s behavior in Kyle (1985).  Note
that our results hold under the assumption of an incomplete market with private information amongst investors.  Then, the information
that is impounded into price through the trading decisions of informed investors can be viewed as public soft information.
13 A possible question at this point refers to the consequences if the principal (strategically) chooses not to release some
signals (we thank Stan Baiman for this observation).  The capital market participants know about the set of public signals.  In our
setting, the principal decides about the disclosure before she learns the outcome of the performance measures.  Thus, by observing
the disclosure decision, investors learn nothing regarding the realization of the signals.
14 However, in order to simplify notation, whenever the result is unambiguous we omit the reference regarding the impact
of information system η on α*, π, and σπ2.
The capital market is assumed to consist of homogeneous rational investors who set the price equal to
the expected value of the firm conditional on all available information yp.12,13  As the performance measures
follow a normal distribution, in computing the price the investors correct the information for the
unconditional mean and weight the information according to their covariance with the terminal value, scaled
by the information’s precision.  Hence, the (gross) market price is characterized by
π(η) ' E[x|yp] ' πo % α*N yp, (1a)
σπ
2(η) / Var[π|yp] ' Var[α*Nyp] ' σx4 ρpN Σp!1 ρp ' σx2 α*Nρp, (1b)
with πo ' (bN ! α*NMp) and
α*(η) ' σx2 Σp!1 ρp, (1c)
where  denotes the investors’ expectations regarding the agent’s actions and the mp×1 vector α*(η)
represents the weights assigned to public information in the investors’ price setting.  Observe that the weights
α*(η), market price π(η), and price volatility σπ2(η) all vary with information system η.14  In particular, the
investors’ aggregation α*(η) reflects the signals’ precision (i.e., Σp!1) and their relation with the firm’s
terminal payoff (i.e., ρp).  Notably, when aggregating public signals the investors do not consider the signals’
informativeness regarding the agent’s actions.
2.2 Agent’s Compensation, Preferences, and Optimal Actions
At date 0, the principal offers the agent a linear contract z ' (f,vπ,vc), where f is the agent’s fixed wage, vπ the
incentive rate for market price, and vc an mc×1 vector of incentive rates for any additional contractible signal.
Hence, the agent’s compensation w, given price π, contractible information yc, and contract z is
w(π,yc,z) ' f % vπ π % vcNyc.
-10-
We assume that the agent’s preferences are represented by a negative exponential utility function, with
u(z,a) ' !exp[!r(w ! κ(a))],
where r is the coefficient of his absolute risk aversion.
Maximizing the expected utility is equivalent to maximizing the certainty equivalent, which is
characterized by
CE(z,a) ' E[w|z,a] ! κ(a) ! ½ r Var[w|z] (2)
' f % vπ ((bN ! α*NMp)  % α*NMp a) % vcNMc a ! ½ aNa ! ½ r (vπ2 σπ2 % vcNΣcvc % 2 vπσπcNvc),
where σπc / Cov[π,yc] is an mc×1 vector of correlations between price π and contractible performance
measures yc.
The agent chooses a to maximize his certainty equivalent.  Differentiating (2) with respect to a, given
contract z, provides the following characterization of the agent’s action choices.
Lemma 1: Given contract z ' (f,vπ,vc), the agent’s optimal action choices are characterized by
a†(vπ,vc) ' MpNα* vπ + McN vc. (3)
Proof: Differentiating (2) with respect to a, and solving the first-order conditions for this variable results
in the optimal action choices as specified in (3).
Observe that by selecting vc, the principal can vary the relative weight for any contractible information.
On the other hand, the weights for non-contractible information (i.e., the weights for soft information that is
included in yp) are given by the investors’ aggregation (i.e., α*).  With respect to these signals, by selecting
vπ the principal can only vary the intensity of the incentives.
2.3 Principal’s Contract Choice
When the principal offers contract z to the agent, she has to take into account that the agent provides
unobservable effort and chooses whether to accept the contract.  The actions that are induced by z are
characterized by (3).  Also, the agent will only participate in the firm if his contract z is such that it provides
him with his reservation wage, which is scaled to equal zero, i.e.,
CE(z,a†) $ 0. (4)
-11-
15 We assume the principal to act in the interest of the long-term shareholders.  The latter are not interested in short-term
prices but in the firm’s terminal value.  The same assumption is made by Baiman and Verrecchia (1995) and Feltham and Xie (1994).
16 The propositions are proven in Appendix A.  While setting (ii) is identical to Section I in Feltham and Xie (1994), setting
(i) is identical to their Section V.
The principal is assumed to be risk neutral with respect to the terminal value of the firm.  She is interested
in maximizing the expected terminal value of the firm net of the agent’s compensation15, i.e.,
Π(a,z,η) ' E[x ! w|a,z,η]. (5)
The principal chooses z such as to maximize (5) subject to (4) and (3).  Substituting (3) into (2), choosing f
such that CE(z,a†) ' 0, and substituting f † and (3) into (5) gives the principal’s unconstrained decision
problem:
Π(vπ,vc,η) ' bN(MpNα* vπ % McNvc) ! ½ (MpNα* vπ % McNvc)N(MpNα* vπ % McNvc) 
! ½ r (vπ2 σπ2 % vcNΣc vc % 2 vπ σπcNvc). (6)
To characterize the solution to the principal’s decision problem, we show the results for the setting where
(i) the principal uses market price π as the sole performance measure, (ii) she only contracts on the
contractible performance measures yc, and (iii) she uses market price and the contractible performance
measures in the agent’s contract.  Proposition 1 summarizes the results.16
Proposition 1: 
(i) Suppose that the principal uses market price as the sole performance measure (i.e., the contract
just includes π); the optimal incentive rate and the principal’s expected net payoff are
characterized by
vπp† ' Qp!1 bNMpNα*, (7a)
Πp
†(η) ' ½ Qp!1 (bNMpNα*)2, (7b)
with Qp ' α*NMp MpNα* % r σπ2.
(ii) Suppose that the principal uses all contractible performance measures except market price in the
agent’s contract (i.e., the contract includes yc); the optimal incentive rates and the principal’s
expected net payoff are characterized by
-12-
vcy† ' Q!1 Mc b, (7c)
Πy
†(η) ' ½ bNMcN Q!1 Mc b, (7d)
with Q / Mc McN % r Σc.
(iii) Suppose that the principal uses all contractible performance measures including market price in
the agent’s contract (i.e., the contract includes yc and π); the optimal incentive rates and the
principal’s expected net payoff are characterized by
 '  / G!1 b, (7e)
Π†(η) ' ½ b G!1 b. (7f)
In setting (i), while there are multiple public performance measures, the principal just uses market price
π.  The relative weights of the public signals in the price formation are given by the aggregation α* chosen
by investors when inferring the firm’s terminal value.  Note that the distinction between soft and hard
information does not influence investors’ inference regarding the firm’s terminal value.  Moreover, using
market price, the principal can indirectly contract on non-contractible information.  Also, from (7a) and (7b),
the aggregation α* is key to the agent’s incentive rate and the principal’s expected net payoff.  In particular,
if the publicly reported signals are not related to the firm’s terminal value (i.e., if ρp'0, implying α*'0), the
principal refrains from motivating the agent’s actions by means of incentive compensation.
In setting (ii), the principal does not use market price.  Results (7c) and (7d) reveal that the investors’
aggregation of public information does not affect the incentive rates offered to the agent and the principal’s
expected net payoff.  Rather, the principal has discretion with respect to selecting the relative weights for
contractible information in the agent’s contract.  Following Feltham and Xie (1994), the relative incentive
rates reflect the performance measures’ precision and their congruency with the firm’s terminal value.  In
particular, the weights are not affected by the correlation between the performance measures and the firm’s
terminal value.
Finally, setting (iii) is a hybrid between (i) and (ii) in that the principal uses all contractible performance
-13-
measures including market price in the agent’s contract.  Following (7e), in general, the investors’
aggregation α* affects all incentive rates, i.e., it also affects the (relative) weights assigned to contractible
information.  Therefore, the characteristics of non-contractible information will influence the incentive rates
chosen for contractible performance measures.  Similar to setting (i), the principal’s expected net payoff will
depend on pricing (i.e., α*); in particular, it will reflect characteristics of disclosed soft information.
To summarize, given that the principal uses market price when contracting with the agent (i.e., settings
(i) and (iii)), the aggregation of public signals by investors directly affects the principal’s expected net payoff.
Importantly, when aggregating public information, the investors are ignorant regarding the impact of their
aggregation on the principal’s surplus.
3. VALUE OF DISCLOSING PERFORMANCE MEASURES TO INVESTORS
Notably, for the three settings of Proposition 1, the investors’ aggregation of public signals (i.e., α*) is
unaffected by the performance measures that are selected by the principal.  On the other hand, varying the
set of performance measures that are reported to investors will, in general, alter aggregation α* and, in settings
(i) and (iii), affect the optimal incentive rates plus the principal’s expected net payoff.  Given the investors’
ignorance regarding the impact of their pricing (i.e., aggregation of public information) on the principal’s
expected net payoff, the value of disclosing information to investors is an open question.
Let ηo represent the initial information system with a set of “internally” released performance measures
(i.e., Yi ' {yi1,..., }) and a set of publicly reported performance measures (i.e., Yp ' {yp1,..., }).  Next,
consider ηs that is identical to ηo except for an additional, previously internal and now publicly reported
performance measure ys 0 Yi.  With ηo, if ys is hard information, the signal is (most likely) included in the
agent’s contract; if it is soft information, we assume that the signal is generated even though it is not used by
the principal.  Therefore, ηs is characterized by YiN and YpN, with YiN ' Yi \ ys and YpN ' Yp c ys. 
The value of disclosing ys to investors (i.e., the disclosure value) follows from comparing the expected
net payoff to the principal under ηo and ηs.  In particular:
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Definition 1: The value of an additional, publicly reported performance measure ys is given by
V†(ys|ηo) / Π†(ηs) ! Π†(ηo). (8)
Following (8), in general, the disclosure value of the supplemental performance measure will depend on
the nature of the incentive problem, the characteristics of ys, and the set of further disclosed performance
measures (characterized by ηo).  More specifically, the value will depend, among other variables, on the
agent’s risk aversion, the assignment of a single or multiple tasks to the agent, the contractibility of
supplemental information (i.e., whether ys is hard or soft information), the number and characteristics of
further public performance measures, i.e., the contractibility of additionally disclosed information.
To gain insight into the value of an additional, publicly reported performance measure, we subsequently
consider several special cases.  In Section 3.1, we consider the baseline setting where the performance
measure under study is the only information that is released to investors.  While Section 3.2 considers the
disclosure of supplemental non-contractible information in a single-task setting, Section 3.3 addresses the
value of supplemental non-contractible information in a multi-task setting.  Finally, Section 3.4 considers the
disclosure value of contractible information, given that non-contractible information is publicly reported.  In
the latter three sections, we first identify conditions under which the supplemental signal is price relevant and
then highlight conditions where disclosure leads to a loss to the principal. 
3.1 Disclosure of a Single Performance Measure
To illustrate the value of disclosing a single type of information to investors, the simplest case to consider
is one in which the agent undertakes a single task and there is one performance measure.  More specifically,
y1 ' m a % ρ1xgx % gμ1, where ρ1xgx is output-related fluctuation reflected in y1 and gμ1 is measurement noise,
with gx ~ N(0,σx2), gμ1 ~ N(0,σμ12), and Cov[gμ1,gx] ' 0; σ12 / Var[y1] ' ρ1x2σx2 % σμ12 is the variance of
performance measure y1.  Under η0, no information regarding the firm’s terminal payoff is publicly reported.
On the other hand, under η1, y1 is disclosed to investors.  While the agent’s compensation is w ' f % v1 y1
under η0, it is w ' f % v1 y1 % vπ π under η1.
Table 1 uses this parameterization in (7a) to (7d) to characterize the incentive rates and the expected net
payoff to the principal, assuming that y1 is either hard (Panel A) or soft information (Panel B).
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17 The infinite number of solutions are characterized by (v1†,vπ†) ' {(v1,vπ) 0 ú2| v1 % α* vπ ' (m2 % r σ12)!1 b m}.
18 Interestingly, since price is an equivalent statistic to soft information, the expected net payoff to the principal is identical
to the expected surplus in the setting with hard information (compare (T1.2d) with (T1.4d)).
----- Insert Table 1 About Here. -----
Given that y1 is hard information, Panel A of Table 1 illustrates that, following (T1.2b), while disclosing
y1 affects investors’ inference of the firm’s terminal value and, thus, market price (i.e., π( ,y1) ' (b ! α* m) 
% α* y1), the disclosure does not influence the principal’s solution to the incentive problem (compare (T1.1c)
with (T1.2c)).  Key to this result is that π(y1) is an equivalent statistic to y1, i.e., π is invertible into y1.
Consequently, Panel A describes one solution out of an infinite number of solutions that are equivalent in
terms of the principal’s expected net payoff; namely, the principal does not use price in the agent’s contract.17
On the other hand, Panel B illustrates that the principal cannot directly use the performance measure if
y1 is soft information.  Hence, if, under η0, y1 is not disclosed, the principal cannot motivate the agent to exert
effort such that her expected net payoff as well as the market price are equal to zero.  To the contrary, with
η1, i.e., given that non-contractible information is disclosed, y1 is impounded in price.  Hence, the principal
can indirectly contract on y1.  In particular, following (T1.4b), y1 is impounded in price if it is assigned a non-
zero weight α*, i.e., if it is informative about uncontrollable events that affect the firm’s terminal payoff (i.e.,
if ρ1x … 0).  Following (T1.4c) and (T1.4d), disclosing y1 enables the principal to induce agent effort and
results in a positive expected net payoff to the principal.18 
Proposition 2 summarizes the results regarding the disclosure value of a single performance measure.
Proposition 2: Disclosing a single performance measure is weakly beneficial to the principal.  In
particular:
(i) Disclosing hard information has no value to the principal (i.e., V†(y1|η0) ' 0);
(ii) Disclosing soft information is strictly valuable to the principal if it is informative about uncontrolla-
ble events that affect the firm’s terminal payoff (i.e., V†(y1|η0) > 0 if ρ1x … 0).
The proof follows directly from substituting (T1.1d) and (T1.2d), or (T1.3d) and (T1.4d) into (8).
Following Proposition 2, disclosing a single performance measure is not harmful to the principal.  More
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19 Assuming that y2 has the same sensitivity to the agent’s action as y1 (i.e., ME[y1]/Ma ' ME[y2]/Ma) is without loss in
generality, since we can always generate an equivalent statistic ψ2 to y2N ' mNa % ρ2xgx % g2 with an arbitrary mN 0 ú, such that ψ2 has
the same sensitivity as y1.
specifically, while the principal is indifferent with respect to disclosure if y1 is hard information, she has strict
preferences for disclosure if y1 is soft information.  Key to this result is that under η0 market price is not used
in the agent’s contract.  Therefore, while disclosing y1 affects investors’ inference regarding the firm’s
terminal payoff and, thus, market price, by setting vπ ' 0 under η1 the principal can always mimic the solution
to the incentive problem under η0.  Hence, there is no downside in disclosing y1. 
Notably, this result generalizes to settings where η0 generates multiple performance measures but
discloses no information and where η1 is identical to η0 except that it publicly reports either one or several
of the performance measures that are generated by η0.  Likewise, the result also generalizes to settings where
multiple tasks are assigned to the agent and contractible information is publicly reported.  Intuitively, both,
the disclosure of a single or multiple performance measures result in a market price that varies with disclosed
information, thus introducing an option for the principal to indirectly contract on this information; on the
other hand, abandoning the option does not prevent the principal from offering the same incentive contract
to the agent as under η0.
3.2 Disclosing Supplemental Non-contractible Information in a Single-task Setting
The preceding analysis provides a simple model to illustrate that disclosing a single performance measure is
weakly beneficial to the principal.  In this subsection we consider a simple setting where disclosing
supplemental, non-contractible information can be detrimental to the principal.  More specifically, we identify
conditions under which additional, publicly reported soft information is detrimental to the principal.
To illustrate this result, we extend the previous model by assuming that there are two non-contractible
performance measures yi ' m a % ρixgx % gμi, i'1,2, where gμi ~ N(0,σμi2), Cov[gμi,gx] ' 0, and Cov[gμ1,gμ2] '
ρ σμ1σμ2.19  While η1 only discloses the initial performance measure (i.e., y1), η2 also discloses a supplemental
performance measure (i.e., y1 and y2).  Thus, V†(y2|η1) reflects the disclosure value of supplemental non-
contractible information (i.e., the value of additional, publicly reported soft information).  Suppose that the
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supplemental signal is (conditionally) informative about the agent’s actions.  Moreover, if this signal is also
contractible, using it in the contract with the agent is (weakly) beneficial to the principal.  However,
additional, publicly reported non-contractible information can yield starkly different results.  
3.2.1 Price-relevance
Even if the supplemental signal is (conditionally) informative about the agent’s action, investors will not
always use this information in their pricing.  Lemma 2 summarizes conditions under which y2 is not used in
the price setting process.
Lemma 2: Investors do not use supplemental information y2 to set the price if (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2) σμ1 '
0.  This condition holds, for example, if:
(i) both signals are not informative about the firm’s terminal payoff (i.e., ρ1x ' ρ2x ' 0);
(ii) the supplemental signal is not informative about either the firm’s terminal payoff or the
measurement error of the initial signal (i.e., ρ2x ' ρ ' 0);
(iii) the initial signal is informative about the firm’s terminal payoff and contains no measurement
error (i.e., ρ1x … 0 and σμ12 ' 0);
(iv) both signals are equally informative about the firm’s terminal payoff and the conditional
measurement error of the initial signal is zero (i.e., ρ1x ' ρ2x and σμ1 ! ρ σμ2 ' 0).
In general, y2 is not price relevant if y1 is a sufficient statistic for y1 and y2 with respect to x.  In particular,
in (i) and (ii), y2 is not informative about the firm’s terminal payoff.  Then, from the market’s perspective,
its only purpose is to reduce measurement noise that is included in y1.  However, if y1 is not used in the first
place (i.e., ρ1x ' 0) or y2 is not informative about y1’s measurement error (ρ ' 0), y2 will not be considered in
price setting.  Interestingly, this includes the special case of a noiseless performance measure (i.e., σ22 ' 0).
Case (iii) characterizes a setting where y1 perfectly reveals x such that, consequently, price perfectly reflects
terminal payoffs.  Finally, case (iv) describes a setting where y2 is merely a garbling of y1.
If any condition outlined in Lemma 2 holds, y2 is not used to derive the firm’s price.  Then, given that
y2 is non-contractible information, the principal can neither directly nor indirectly use the supplemental
performance measure in the contract with the agent.  
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Assuming that neither condition outlined in Lemma 2 holds, using the model’s parameterization in (1a)
and (1b) gives the sensitivity of market price to the agent’s action (i.e., ME[π|η2]/Ma) and price volatility (i.e.,
σπ
2(η2)), which are characterized by
ME[π|η2]/Ma ' Q!1 m (ρ1xσμ22 ! ρ (ρ1x % ρ2x) σμ1σμ2 % ρ2xσμ12) σx2, (9a)
σπ
2(η2) ' Q!1 (ρ1x2σμ22 ! 2 ρ ρ1x ρ2x σμ1σμ2 % ρ2x2σμ12) σx4, (9b)
where Q / (ρ1x2σx2 % σμ12)(ρ2x2σx2 % σμ22) ! (ρ1xρ2xσx2 % ρ σμ1σμ2)2.  Observe that both figures are key to the
solution of the principal’s decision problem under η2.
3.2.2 Disclosure Value
Since both performance measures yi, i'1,2, are non-contractible, the solution to the principal’s problem with
η1 is the same as the solution in Section 3.1 (see Panel B in Table 1).  In particular, the principal’s expected
net payoff is characterized by (T1.4d).  On the other hand, using the parameterization for η2 in (7b) gives the
principal’s expected net payoff as
Π†(η2) ' ½ , (10)
where ME[π|η2]/Ma is given by (9a) and σπ2 is given by (9b).  Substituting (T1.4d) and (10) into (8) and
simplifying yields the value of disclosing y2, given disclosure of y1, as
V†(y2|η1) ' ½ . (11)
Suppose that the conditions outlined in Lemma 2 do not hold, i.e., supplemental information is
impounded in price.  Then, following (11), the sign of its disclosure value depends on the market prices’
signal-to-noise ratios under η2 versus η1 (Kim and Suh 1991; Lambert 2001).  In particular, disclosing
supplemental information is beneficial to the principal if the signal-to-noise ratio with η2 is larger than the
signal-to-noise ratio with η1 (i.e., if ME[π|η2]/Ma / σπ > m / σ1).  In general, given that the supplemental
information is impounded in price, disclosure of y2 increases price volatility (i.e., σπ2(η2) > σπ2(η1) ' σ12 if
Lemma 2 does not hold), whereas the impact of disclosure on the sensitivity of market price to the agent’s
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20 Observe that volatility increases in the performance measure’s payoff informativeness.  Intuitively, for a more informative
signal, price varies to a larger extent with the disclosed signal.
action is ambiguous.  Proposition 3 summarizes necessary and sufficient conditions under which disclosing
supplemental information y2 is detrimental to the principal. 
Proposition 3: A divergent informativeness of the initial versus the supplemental performance measure
regarding the firm’s terminal payoff is a necessary condition for a negative value of supplemental,
publicly reported information (i.e., ρ1x…ρ2x).  Sufficient conditions for a negative disclosure value include,
for example, modest measurement error in the initial performance measure and a relatively more payoff-
informative supplemental performance measure with
(i) no measurement error (i.e., σμ12 < (1!ρ1x2) σx2, ρ2x2 > ρ1x2 % σμ12/σx2, and σμ2 ' 0);
(ii) unrelated measurement error (i.e., σμ12 < (1!2 ρ1x/ρ2x) σμ22 % (ρ2x2!ρ1x2) σx2, ρ2x > 2 ρ1x > 0, and ρ ' 0).
In settings (i) and (ii), volatility increases with disclosure because (a) the initial performance measure is
subject to only modest measurement error and (b) the supplemental performance measure is substantially
more informative about terminal payoffs than the initial signal.20  If the supplemental performance measure
is substantially more informative about the firm’s terminal payoff than the initial performance measure,
investors assign a relatively larger weight to the former signal (i.e., α2* versus α1*), yielding a lower sensitivity
of price to the agent’s action.  Consequently, the additional, publicly reported signal decreases the signal-to-
noise ratio of market price and, according to (11), has a negative disclosure value.  
Fundamental to Proposition 3 is that investors are ignorant regarding the impact of their pricing on the
principal’s expected net payoff.  Intuitively, whereas the principal would assign a relatively larger weight to
y1 (because of its modest measurement error), investors place a relatively larger weight on y2 (because of its
higher payoff informativeness).  It is this divergence in the aggregation of the performance measures (Paul
1992, Feltham and Xie 1994) that causes the negative disclosure value.  Interestingly, this chain of reasoning
holds for the case where the supplemental signal possesses no measurement error (Proposition 3 (i)) and the
case where its measurement error is unrelated to the measurement error of the initial signal (Proposition 3
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21 Note that these additional conditions affect the cutoff-values for the measurement error of the initial signal and the
supplemental signal’s payoff informativeness.
22 For simplicity, mij $ 0, i, j ' 1,2.
(ii)).21
Observe that Proposition 3 holds as long as market price is used as the sole performance measure in the
agent’s contract.  Key to this result is that investors aggregate information regardless of its contractibility,
i.e., the weight αi* assigned to yi is not affected by this signal’s contractibility.  On the other hand, if either
the initial or the supplemental performance measure is contractible, disclosure value for the supplemental
signal will be non-negative.  With at least one contractible performance measure, by varying the incentive
rate for this signal the principal can induce any relative weights for both, the contractible signal and market
price, including the weights that she would choose if both signals were contractible.  
3.3 Disclosing Supplemental Non-contractible Information in a Two-task Setting
We now consider a simple model that starkly illustrates how, in a two-task setting, supplemental, publicly
reported non-contractible information can be detrimental to the principal.  Unlike the previous model, we
assume that two actions a1 and a2 influence two aggregate, non-contractible performance measures yi ' mi1a1
% mi2a2 % ρixgx % gμi,  i'1,2, where gμi ~ N(0,σμi2), Cov[gμi,gx] ' 0, and Cov[gμ1,gμ2] ' ρ σμ1σμ2.22  As in the
previous model, while η1 only discloses an initial performance measure (i.e., y1), η2 also discloses a
supplemental performance measure (i.e., y1 and y2).  Hence, V†(y2|η1) continues to reflect the disclosure value
of supplemental non-contractible information.
Note that Lemma 2 continues to apply in this setting.  Key to this result is that investors are only
interested in the signals’ payoff-informativeness, which is not affected by the agent’s effort choices.  More
generally, while the weight for y1 under η1 is given by α* ' (ρ1x2 % σμ12/σx2)!1 ρ1x (see Table 1), using (1c), with
η2 the weights for both signals are given by
α1
* ' Q!1 (ρ1x σμ2 ! ρ ρ2x σμ1) σμ2 σx2, (12a)
α2
* ' Q!1 (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2) σμ1 σx2, (12b)
where Q / (ρ1x2σx2 % σμ12)(ρ2x2σx2 % σμ22) ! (ρ1xρ2xσx2 % ρ σμ1σμ2)2.  Applying these weights to the performance
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23 Note that the two measures of non-congruity and the measure of alignment are functionally related.
measures determines how the agent’s actions influence market price.
Subsequently, to illustrate our results, we first consider a setting where the agent is risk-neutral
(Subsection 3.3.1) before considering the setting with a risk-averse agent (Subsection 3.3.2).
3.3.1 Disclosure Value with a Two-task Risk-neutral Agent
With a risk-neutral agent, the principal’s objective is to motivate an efficient effort allocation across tasks.
Note that if the gross payoff to the principal is non-contractible information, then risk neutrality is not
sufficient to achieve the first-best result (Feltham and Xie 1994).  Moreover, with both information systems
η1 and η2, given non-contractible performance measures y1 and y2, market price is the sole contractible
performance measure.
Let π(ηk) ' μk1 a1 % μk2 a2 % gkπ represent market price given information system ηk, k'1,2, where the
sensitivity to the agent’s actions (i.e., μk1 and μk2) and the noise in price (i.e., gkπ) all depend on ηk.  More
specifically, the parameters depend on the aggregation weights implied by ηk.  Using this parameterization
in (7b), assuming the agent is risk-neutral (i.e., r 6 0), yields the principal’s expected net payoff, given by
Π†(ηk) ' ½ Qk!1 (b1 μk1 % b2 μk2)2, k'1,2, (13)
with Qk / μk12 % μk22.  Substituting (13) for k ' 1,2 into (8) and simplifying yields the value of the additional,
publicly reported performance measure y2, i.e., 
V†(y2|η1) ' ½ Q1!1Q2!1 A12 [Ab1 (b1μ21 % b2μ22) % Ab2 (b1μ11 % b2μ12)], (14)
where Abk / b1μk2 ! b2μk1 is the measure of non-congruity for market price π(ηk), relative to the firm’s terminal
payoff, and A12 / μ12μ21 ! μ11μ22 is the measure of alignment between market prices π(η1) and π(η2) as implied
by information system ηk (Feltham and Wu 2000).
Disclosure value of y2 depends in a non-trivial way on the measures of non-congruity for the two
information systems.23  For example, if the market price that is induced by the initial performance measure
is perfectly congruent (i.e., if Ab1 ' 0), (14) simplifies to V†(y2|η1) ' !½Q2!1Ab22 # 0.  Then, disclosing a
supplemental performance measure that yields a non-congruent price (i.e., a signal with Ab2 … 0) is detrimental
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to the principal.  Key to this result is that risk neutrality and a perfectly congruent market price under η1 are
sufficient to achieve the first-best result.  On the other hand, while disclosing a supplemental performance
measure improves market price’s informativeness regarding the firm’s terminal payoff, the expected net
payoff to the principal declines if this signal is not congruent.  Secondly, disclosing a supplemental
performance measure is of no value to the principal if it is perfectly aligned with the initial signal (i.e., if A12
' 0).  Given two aligned public signals, market price’s measure of non-congruity is identical to the non-
congruity for either signal.  With risk neutrality, however, price congruency is the single key driver of
inefficiencies in the agency.
More generally, price congruency depends on the weights assigned to public information.  Using the
signals’ weights under η1 and η2 (Table 1, (12a), and (12b)) in (1a) yields a functional relation between market
price, the agent’s actions, and payoff and measurement noise.  Table 2 summarizes these relations for η1 and
η2 along with expressions for the price sensitivity to the agent’s actions.
----- Insert Table 2 About Here. -----
Substituting (T2.1b), (T2.2b), and (T2.2c) into (14) yields a non-trivial expression for the value of the
additional, publicly reported performance measure y2.  The sign of V†(y2|η1) is, in general, ambiguous.
Assuming that y2 is used by investors in pricing the firm’s terminal payoff (i.e., assuming that Lemma 2 does
not apply), while disclosing supplemental information y2 can be beneficial to the principal, for emphasis, we
focus on conditions under which the disclosure value will be negative:
Proposition 4: Suppose the agent is risk-neutral; an additional, publicly reported performance measure
has a negative disclosure value, for example, if:
(i) the initial performance measure is congruent with the firm’s terminal payoff (i.e., b1/b2 ' m11/m12);
(ii) one of the agent’s tasks is window dressing that only affects the supplemental performance measure
(i.e., bi ' m1i ' 0 and m2i … 0 for either i'1 or i'2);
(iii) measurement error is unrelated, the supplemental performance measure covaries positively with the
firm’s terminal payoff and responds relatively more strongly to effort in the second task than does
the initial performance measure, which, in turn, responds relatively more strongly to effort in the
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second task than does the firm’s terminal payoff (i.e., ρ ' 0, ρ2x > 0, and m21/m22 < m11/m12 < b1/b2).
Key to the negative disclosure value is the effect of disclosing y2 on the congruency of market price,
relative to the firm’s terminal payoff.  In particular, Proposition 4 identifies sufficient conditions under which
disclosure of both, the initial plus the supplemental performance measure yields a less congruent price than
does disclosure of merely the initial performance measure.  For example, this holds in Proposition 4 (i) with
a perfectly congruent initial performance measure, implying a likewise perfectly congruent market price.  As
a corollary, disclosure value will be negative if the initial performance measure is perfectly congruent in the
sense that it does not respond to window dressing (Proposition 4 (ii)).  Finally, Proposition 4 (iii) gives an
example where the initial performance measure is non-congruent (e.g., it responds relatively more strongly
to effort in the second task than does the firm’s terminal payoff), but the supplemental performance measure
is even less congruent (e.g., the relative response to effort in the second task is even more pronounced as
compared with the initial signal).  Here, any (positive) weighting of the two signals in the investors’ pricing
yields a less congruent market price than the weighting of merely the initial performance measure.
Note that the latter result is in stark contrast to the result for a two-task setting with contractible
performance measures.  There, releasing a non-aligned second performance measure is sufficient to achieve
the first-best result.  While in the latter setting it is the principal who selects the relative weights for the
performance measures, in our setting it is the investors that weight the signals via their pricing.  In particular,
with contractible performance measures, the principal selects a negative weight for the supplemental
performance measure (yielding a perfectly congruent total performance measure), while, due to the positive
covariance between the supplemental performance measure and the firm’s terminal payoff, the investors
choose a positive weight.
3.3.2 Disclosure Value with a Two-task Risk-averse Agent
We now consider a simple model that integrates both reasons for a negative disclosure value, i.e., the market
price is either noisier or less congruent as a consequence of the disclosure of a supplemental, non-contractible
performance measure.  The agent controls two tasks and there are two aggregate, non-contractible
performance measures.  Hence, the model is the same as the model in the previous subsection, except that the
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agent is risk averse.  For illustration, we assume that the initial performance measure is perfectly congruent
(i.e., Ab1 ' b1m12 ! b2m11 ' 0), the supplemental performance measure, in general, responds differently to the
second task (i.e., m21 ' b1 and m22 > 0), the noise variables have unit variance (i.e., σx2 ' σμ12 ' σμ22 ' 1), and
measurement error is unrelated (i.e., ρ ' 0).
Proposition 5 characterizes two settings under which disclosing supplemental information y2 will be
detrimental to the principal.
Proposition 5: Suppose the agent is risk-averse; an additional, publicly reported performance measure
has a negative disclosure value, for example, if:
(i) the agent’s productivity is identical across tasks, the supplemental performance measure responds
more strongly to effort in the second task than does the initial measure, and both signals are equally
but limitedly informative regarding the firm’s terminal payoff (i.e., b1 ' b2 ' b, m22 > b, ρ1x' ρ2x' ρx,
and ρx2 < ρx);
(ii) the agent’s second task is a window-dressing activity and the supplemental performance measure
strongly responds to this activity (i.e., b2 ' 0 and m222 > r ρx2!1 [2 ρ1x(1%ρ1x2) ! ρ2x(ρ1x2 % ρ2x2)]).
In the setting described by Proposition 5 (i), publicly reporting the supplemental performance measure
results in a non-congruent price.  However, given identical weights for both signals, market price’s measure
of non-congruity is unaffected by the payoff-informativeness of the two signals (i.e., ρx).  On the contrary,
price volatility is strictly monotonically increasing in payoff-informativeness.  Thus, for a low informative-
ness, strong effort incentives (i.e., vπ†) result.  Given that strong incentives amplify the consequences for the
firm’s terminal payoff of differences in the performance measure’s congruity, a large downside of disclosing
the supplemental signal exists, thus resulting in the negative disclosure value.
Likewise, in the setting of Proposition 5 (ii), price is non-congruent if supplemental information is
publicly reported.  On the other hand, depending on the signals’ payoff-informativeness, disclosing both
signals may yield a larger signal-to-noise ratio.  While a non-congruent performance measure results in an
inefficient effort allocation, the agent demands a risk premium to bear the performance measure inaccuracy.
Therefore, disclosing supplemental information is detrimental to the principal if the loss in inefficient effort
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24 The only exception refers to the knife-edge case where the non-contractible information is no longer impounded in price,
given the disclosure of the contractible information.  Then, the principal is weakly worse off.
allocation exceeds the gains in risk premium.  This is the case, if the supplemental performance measure
strongly responds to the window-dressing activity.
3.4 Disclosing Supplemental Contractible Information
So far, the analysis addressed the value to the principal of supplemental, publicly reported non-contractible
information.  Subsequently, we will consider the value of disclosing contractible information in addition to
other non-contractible information.  Note that, following Proposition 2 (i), disclosing a single contractible
performance measure has no value to the principal.  Likewise, disclosing contractible information is, in
general, of no value if the performance measure is publicly reported in addition to a single non-contractible
performance measure.24  Key to this result is that the principal can always use the contractible performance
measure to undo this signal’s impact on market price; the “filtered” market price, however, is an equivalent
statistic to market price in the setting where the contractible performance measure is not publicly reported.
However, disclosing a contractible performance measure in addition to multiple non-contractible performance
measures yields starkly different results.
To illustrate these differences, we extend the model in Subsection 3.2 by considering a contractible
performance measure yc ' m a % ρcxgx % gμc plus two non-contractible performance measures yi ' m a % ρixgx
% gμi, i'1,2, where gμj ~ N(0,σμj2), j'1,2,c, Cov[gμj,gx] ' 0, Cov[gμ1,gμ2] ' ρ σμ1σμ2, and Cov[gμi,gμc] ' ρci σμcσμi.
While η2 publicly reports both non-contractible performance measures (i.e., y1 and y2), η3 also discloses the
contractible performance measure (i.e., yc).  Thus, V†(yc|η2) reflects the value of additional, publicly reported
contractible information.
Similar to Subsection 3.2, using the model’s parameterization in (1c), Lemma 3 summarizes conditions
under which yc is not used in the price setting process.
Lemma 3: The capital market does not use supplemental information yc to set the price if 
ρcx ' (1!ρ2)!1 [(ρc2 ! ρ ρc1) ρ2x/σμ2 % (ρc1 ! ρ ρc2) ρ1x/σμ1] σμc.
This condition holds, for example, if:
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(i) all three signals are not informative about the firm’s terminal payoff (i.e., ρ1x ' ρ2x ' ρcx ' 0);
(ii) the supplemental signal is not informative about either the firm’s terminal payoff or the measurement
error of the initial signals (i.e., ρc1 ' ρc2 ' ρcx ' 0);
(iii) at least one non-contractible signal is informative about the firm’s terminal payoff and contains no
measurement error (i.e., ρix … 0 and σμi2 ' 0 for i'1 or i'2);
(iv) the non-contractible signals are identical (i.e., ρ1x ' ρ2x, σμ1 ' σμ2, ρc1 ' ρc2, and ρ ' 1).
Observe the similarity between the conditions in Lemma 3 and those in Lemma 2.  More specifically, the
line of reasoning for Lemma 3 parallels the logic to Lemma 2.  In particular, if any condition outlined in
Lemma 3 holds, yc is not used to derive the firm’s price and the value of disclosing yc is zero.  
Note that information systems η2 and η3 are identical except for the induced market price.  Thus, the
performance comparison of η2 and η3 relies on the sensitivity of market price to the agent’s action and price’s
(conditional) variance.  Similar to Subsection 3.2, given that supplemental information is impounded in price,
disclosure of yc (weakly) increases price volatility (i.e., σπ2(η3) $ σπ2(η2) if Lemma 3 does not hold).  On the
contrary, the impact of disclosing yc on both, the sensitivity of market price and the correlation between
market price and the contractible performance measure, is ambiguous.  Hence, in general, publicly reporting
an additional contractible performance measure can be both beneficial and detrimental to the principal.
Applying the model’s parameterization to (8), using (7e) and (7f), results in an expression for the
disclosure value V†(yc|η2).  However, using this expression to identify cutoff-values yields rather complex
closed-form solutions.  Hence, we employ a numerical example to demonstrate that, with multiple non-
contractible performance measures, the principal can have strict preferences regarding the disclosure of
additional contractible information.
Figure 1 illustrates these preferences.  Here, m ' b ' 1, r ' 1, σμ1 ' σμ2 ' σμc ' σx ' 1, ρ1x ' 1/8, ρ2x ' ½,
ρcx ' ρc1 ' ρc2 ' 1/10.
------- Insert Figure 1 About Here.  -------
In the example, besides three knife-edge conditions, the principal is not indifferent regarding the
disclosure of contractible information.  More specifically, the principal benefits from publicly reporting yc
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if measurement error of the two non-contractible performance measures is highly correlated (i.e., for large
values of |ρ|).  With η2, for a relatively negative correlation, the investors assign a negative weight to one
signal, yielding a weak sensitivity of market price to the agent’s action.  On the other hand, for a large
positive correlation, a high volatility results.  In both cases, disclosure of yc under η3 increases the sensitivity
of market price to the agent’s action, which is particularly beneficial in case of a relatively negative
correlation.
Notably, unlike disclosure of a contractible performance measure in settings with either no or merely a
single publicly reported, non-contractible performance measure, the principal has strict preferences for
disclosing  contractible information in settings with multiple public, non-contractible performance measures.
Then, the value of disclosing contractible information depends on the information already available to the
capital market.  Intuitively, disclosure affects the investors’ inferences regarding the firm’s terminal payoff,
the weights that they assign to the disclosed performance measures and, as a consequence, the sensitivity and
(conditional) variance of market price.  As the numerical example illustrates, the performance comparison
of disclosure versus non-disclosure can go either way.  Proposition 6 summarizes necessary conditions for
the principal to have a strict preference regarding the disclosure of an additional contractible performance
measure.
Proposition 6: Suppose that information system ηs is identical to information system ηo, except for the
additional disclosure of a contractible performance measure yc; necessary conditions for the principal to
have a strict preference regarding the disclosure or non-disclosure of a contractible performance measure
(i.e., V†(yc|ηo) … 0) include,
(i) ηo publicly reports at least two non-contractible performance measures;
(ii) disclosure of yc alters investors’ aggregation of information into price (i.e., αc*(ηs) … 0, αi*(ηs) … αi*(ηo)
for at least one i 0 Yo);
(iii) with ηo, the principal uses market price π in the contract with the agent (i.e., with ηo, vπ* … 0).
Note that Proposition 6 carries forward to a multi-task setting.  There, altered weights imply a (weak)
change in the market price’s congruency with the firm’s terminal payoff.  Similarly, the change in congruency
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can be beneficial as well as detrimental to the principal.  For example, suppose agent risk-aversion is
negligible.  Then, the value of disclosure will be negative if the contractible performance measure and price
are not aligned with ηo, but they are aligned with ηs.
As a corollary to Proposition 6, if the new information is price relevant (i.e., αc*(ηs) … 0), the principal
will have strict preferences regarding its disclosure.  However, while price informativeness weakly increases
as a consequence of the additional information that is available to investors, disclosing contractible
information can leave the principal strictly worse off.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we examine the economic consequences of disclosing different types of information to the
capital market.  Our study is motivated by the recently proposed focus on decision-usefulness as the primary
objective of financial accounting and the ongoing demand for more disclosure of soft information.  In our
analysis, market price serves as a performance measure in the contract between a risk neutral principal and
a risk and effort averse agent.  We extend a standard multi-task LEN-model to include the firm’s market price
and investigate the relation between price efficiency and solution of an agency conflict.  More specifically,
we investigate the disclosure of additional soft and hard information from a stewardship perspective.  
We find that while publicly reported additional information improves price efficiency, the impact of more
disclosed information on the principal’s expected net payoff is ambiguous.  Hence, we present a rationale for
partial disclosure that is complementary to proprietary costs or uncertainty concerning the quantity of
information.  Contrary to much of the earlier work on partial disclosure, rather than withholding information
ex post because it draws a bad picture of the firm (and thus leads to a lower stock-price), the principal
commits ex ante (i.e., before the information is generated) to not disclose the information.  In our setting,
withholding information is valuable because the contracting usefulness of market price decreases as a
consequence of the disclosure. 
Based on our findings, we conclude that stewardship and decision-usefulness are potentially conflicting
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objectives of financial accounting.  This is consistent, e.g., with empirical evidence provided by Gassen
(2008).  Thus, abandoning stewardship as a separate objective of financial accounting and mandating further
disclosure of soft information by standard setters and regulators can result in lower productivity and reduced
firm value.  Also, firms can be compelled to offset the negative consequences of mandatory disclosure by
reducing their amount of voluntary disclosure.  Likewise, it can be optimal for firms to disclose aggregated
soft information (if possible) instead of detailed information.  This result is similar to Bushman and
Indjejikian (1993), who show that it can be optimal to disclose distorted information.
 Our findings have implications for empiricists, standard setters, and regulators.  Given that non-
contractible information is not verifiable and, thus, prone to window dressing by managers, disclosing (more)
soft information will result in a re-allocation of effort from productive to non-productive tasks.  Moreover,
increasing the level of disclosure yields a noisier price.  Hence, assuming a mandatory disclosure regime, we
expect to observe a larger relative weight on accounting earnings as compared to stock price after more
comprehensive requirements for disclosure of soft information are in effect.  In a similar vain, increased
mandatory requirements can result in a reduction of the amount of voluntary disclosure, including the
disclosure of hard information.  Finally, standard setters frequently change disclosure standards one at a time.
Our results, however, indicate that the “value of a standard” crucially depends on the standards that are
already in place.  In general, adjusting a standard in the sense of increasing demand for disclosing either hard




Proposition 1:  The principal’s unconstrained decision problem is given by (6).  (i) Setting vc'0 and
differentiating (6) with respect to vπ and solving the first order condition for vπ gives (7a).  Substituting (7a)
and vc'0 into (6) yields the principal’s expected net payoff as characterized by (7b).  (ii) Setting vπ'0 and
differentiating (6) with respect to vc and solving the first order conditions for all vc yields (7c).  Substituting
(7c) plus vπ'0 into (6) and simplifying yields the principal’s expected net payoff as depicted in (7d).  (iii)
Differentiating (6) with respect to vπ and vc, and solving for vπ and all v yields  (7e).  Substituting (7e) in (6)
yields the principal’s expected net payoff as characterized by (7f). 
Lemma 2:  Applying the model’s parameterization to (1c) yields the following weights that are assigned to
the two non-contractible signals by the investors:
α1
* ' Q!1 (ρ1x σμ2 ! ρ ρ2x σμ1) σμ2 σx2, (A.1a)
α2
* ' Q!1 (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2) σμ1 σx2, (A.1b)
where Q / (ρ1x2σx2 % σμ12)(ρ2x2σx2 % σμ22) ! (ρ1xρ2xσx2 % ρ σμ1σμ2)2.  Following (A.1b), the weight assigned to the
supplemental information y2 will be zero if (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2) σμ1 ' 0.  Settings (i) to (iv) describe conditions
under which the weight will be zero. 
Proposition 3: Substituting (9a), (9b), and ρ1x ' ρ2x ' ρx into (11) and simplifying yields the value of
disclosing y2, given disclosure of y1 as
V†(y2|η1) ' ½  $ 0,
with Q / (ρx2σx2 % σμ12)(ρx2σx2 % σμ22) ! (ρx2 σx2 % ρ σμ1σμ2)2.  Since V†(y2|η1) $ 0, ρ1x … ρ2x is a necessary
condition.  (i) Substituting (9a), (9b), and σμ2 ' 0 into (11) and simplifying yields
V†(y2|η1) ' ½ . (A.2)
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The numerator in (A.2) is negative if σμ1 % (ρ1x2 ! ρ2x2) σx2 < 0.  Solving this condition for ρ2x2 yields the cutoff
value for the payoff-informativeness of the second performance measure.  Since ρ2x 0 [!1,1], this cutoff value
must be strictly smaller than 1 for a non-empty solution set.  Solving the latter condition for σμ12 results in the
cutoff value for the measurement error of the first performance measure.  (ii) Substituting (9a), (9b), and σμ2
' 0 into (11) and simplifying yields
V†(y2|η1) ' ½ , (A.3)
where Q ' ρ1x2 σμ22 σx2 % σμ12(σμ22 % ρ2x2 σx2).  The denominator in (A.3) is positive; the numerator is negative
if
σ1
2 [2 ρ1x σμ22 % ρ2x(σμ12 ! σμ22 % (ρ1x2 ! ρ2x2)σx2)] < 2 ρ1x2 (ρ2x ! ρ1x) σμ22 σx2. (A.4)
For ρ2x > ρ1x > 0, the right hand side of (A.4) is positive.  Thus, the numerator is negative if the left hand side
of (A.4) is negative, i.e., 
2 ρ1x σμ22 % ρ2x(σμ12 ! σμ22 % (ρ1x2 ! ρ2x2)σx2) < 0.
Solving the latter condition for σμ12 yields the cutoff value for the measurement error of the first performance
measure.  Finally, for ρ2x > 2 ρ1x this cutoff value is positive, yielding a non-empty solution set. 
Propositions 4: (i) First, substitute (T2.1b), (T2.2b), and (T2.2c) into (14) to obtain an expression for the
value of the additional, publicly reported performance measure.  (i) Substituting m11/m12 ' b1/b2 yields
V†(y2|η1) ' ! ½ Q!1 b12 (b1m22 ! b2m21)2 σμ12 (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2)2 # 0. (A.5)
Interestingly, the value is zero, e.g., if the second performance measure is perfectly congruent with the firm’s
terminal payoff (i.e., b1/b2 ' m21/m22) and if the second performance measure is not impounded in the price
(i.e., ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2 ' 0, see Lemma 2).  (ii) For example, substituting b2 ' m12 ' 0 into the expression for
disclosure value yields
V†(y2|η1) ' !½ ,
which is non-positive.  In particular, disclosure value will be negative if the supplemental information is




where Λ12 ' m11m22 ! m12m21, Λb1 ' b1m12 ! b2m11, and Λb2 ' b1m22 ! b2m21 are the measures of alignment and
non-congruity, respectively, for the non-contractible performance measures.  Disclosure value will be
negative if Λ12 > 0, Λb1 > 0, Λb2 > 0, and ρ2x > 0.  Evaluation of the conditions for the measures of alignment
and non-congruity yields the relation of the sensitivities of the performance measures and the tasks’
productivity. 
Propositions 5: Substituting the model’s parameterization into (7b) and (8) yields an expression for the value
of the additional, publicly reported performance measure.  (i) Substituting b1 ' b2 ' b and ρ1x ' ρ2x ' ρx results
in the expression for the disclosure value for this setting.  The disclosure value is negative if
ρx
2 < ρx / ,
where ρx ' ρx yields V†(y2|η1) ' 0.  Finally, m22 > b ensures that the numerator of the above expression is
positive.  (ii) Substituting b2 ' 0 in the expression for the disclosure value, setting the numerator equal to zero
and solving the equation for m222 yields
m222 / m222 ' r ρx2!1 [2 ρ1x(1%ρ1x2) ! ρ2x(ρ1x2 % ρ2x2)].
The slope of V†(y1|η2) at m222 / m222 is negative; thus, disclosure value is negative if m222 > m222. 
Lemma 3:  Applying the model’s parameterization to (1c) yields the following weights that are assigned to
the contractible signal yc and the two non-contractible signals yi, i'1,2 by the investors:
αc
* ' Q!1 [(1 ! ρ2)ρcx σμ1 σμ2 ! ((ρc1 ! ρ ρc2)ρ1x σμ2 % (ρc2 ! ρ ρc1)ρ2x σμ1)σc] σμ1 σμ2 σx2, (A.6a)
α1
* ' Q!1 [(1 ! ρc22)ρ1x σμ2 σc ! ((ρc1 ! ρ ρc2)ρcx σμ2 % (ρ ! ρc1ρc2)ρ2x σc)σμ1] σμ2 σc σx2, (A.6b)
α2
* ' Q!1 [(1 ! ρc12)ρ2x σμ1 σc ! ((ρc2 ! ρ ρc1)ρcx σμ1 % (ρ ! ρc1ρc2)ρ1x σc)σμ2] σμ1 σc σx2, (A.6c)
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where Q is the determinant of Σp.  Following (A.6a), the weight assigned to the supplemental contractible
information yc will be zero if (1 ! ρ2)ρcx σμ1 σμ2 ! ((ρc1 ! ρ ρc2)ρ1x σμ2 % (ρc2 ! ρ ρc1)ρ2x σμ1)σc ' 0.  Settings (i)
to (iv) describe conditions under which the weight will be zero. 
Proposition 6: Proof is by contradiction.  (i) If there is only a single publicly reported non-contractible signal,
by subtracting appropriately weighted contractible performance measures, the principal obtains a filtered
market price that only reflects the non-contractible information.  This result holds for an arbitrary number of
disclosed contractible performance measures.  Therefore, disclosure does not change the characteristics of
the set of contractible performance measures.  (ii) Suppose that disclosure does not affect investors’
aggregation of information into price.  Then, the principal can filter out the impact of the additional,
contractible information from market price and obtains a filtered price that is an equivalent statistic to the
initial market price where the supplemental information is not disclosed.  (iii) If the principal does not initially
use market price in the contract with the agent, disclosure will not deteriorate the characteristics of the set of
contractible performance measures.  Here, disclosure value is non-negative. 
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Table 1
Disclosure of a Single Performance Measure
Panel A: Performance Measure y1 is Hard Information
η0 - no public performance measure
a†(v1) ' m v1, (T1.1a)
π(η0) ' (m2 % r σ12)!1 b2 m2, (T1.1b)
v1† ' (m2 % r σ12)!1 b m, (T1.1c)
Π†(η0) ' ½ (m2 % r σ12)!1 b2 m2, (T1.1d)
η1 - disclosure of y1
a†(v1,vπ) ' m v1 % α* m vπ, (T1.2a)
π(y1|η1) ' (m2 % r σ12)!1 b2 m2 % α* (y1 ! E[y1| ,z,η1]), (T1.2b)
v1† ' (m2 % r σ12)!1 b m and vπ† ' 0, (T1.2c)
Π†(η1) ' ½ (m2 % r σ12)!1 b2 m2, (T1.2d)
with α* ' (ρ1x2 % σμ12/σx2)!1 ρ1x,
σ1
2 ' ρ1x2σx2 % σμ12, and
E[y1| ,z,η1] ' (m2 % r σ12)!1 b m3.
Panel B: Performance Measure y1 is Soft Information
η0 - no public performance measure
a† ' 0, (T1.3a)
π(η0) '  ' 0, (T1.3b)
v1† ' 0, (T1.3c)
Π†(η0) ' 0, (T1.3d)
η1 - disclosure of y1 with ρ1x … 0
a†(vπ) ' α* m vπ, (T1.4a)
π(y1|η1) ' (m2 % r σπ2/α*2)!1 b2 m2 % α* (y1 ! E[y1| ,z,η1]), (T1.4b)
v1† ' 0 and vπ† ' 1/α* (m2 % r σπ2/α*2)!1 b m, (T1.4c)
Π†(η1) ' ½ [m2 % r (ρ1x2σx2 % σμ12)]!1 b2 m2, (T1.4d)
with α* ' (ρ1x2 % σμ12/σx2)!1 ρ1x,
σπ
2(η1) ' (ρ1x2 % σμ12/σx2)!1 ρ1x2 σx2, and
E[y1| ,z,η1] ' (m2 % r σπ2/α*2)!1 b m3.
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Table 2
Market Price and Price Sensitivity Under η1 and η2
η1 - disclosure of y1
π(η1)' πo(η1) %  (ρ1x2 % σμ12/σx2)!1 ρ1x m11 a1 % (ρ1x2 % σμ12/σx2)!1 ρ1x m12 a2 % α* (ρ1xgx % gμ1), (T2.1a)
μ11 / (ρ1x2 % σμ12/σx2)!1 ρ1x m11, and μ12 / (ρ1x2 % σμ12/σx2)!1 ρ1x m12. (T2.1b)
η2 - disclosure of y1 and y2
π(η2) ' πo(η2) % Q!1 [(ρ1x σμ2 ! ρ ρ2x σμ1) σμ2 m11 % (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2) σμ1 m21] σx2 a1 
% Q!1 [(ρ1x σμ2 ! ρ ρ2x σμ1) σμ2 m12 % (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2) σμ1 m22] σx2 a2
% Q!1 [ρ1x2 σμ22 ! ρ ρ1x ρ2x σμ1 σμ2 % ρ2x2 σμ12 ! ρ ρ1x ρ2x σμ1 σμ2] σx2 gx
% Q!1 σx2 [(ρ1x σμ2 ! ρ ρ2x σμ1) σμ2 gμ1 % (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2) σμ1 gμ2], (T2.2a)
μ21 / Q!1 [(ρ1x σμ2 ! ρ ρ2x σμ1) σμ2 m11 % (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2) σμ1 m21] σx2, and (T2.2b)
μ22 / Q!1 [(ρ1x σμ2 ! ρ ρ2x σμ1) σμ2 m12 % (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2) σμ1 m22] σx2, (T2.2c)
with Q / (ρ1x2σx2 % σμ12)(ρ2x2σx2 % σμ22) ! (ρ1xρ2xσx2 % ρ σμ1σμ2)2.
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Figure 1
cValue of a Publicly Reported Contractible Performance Measure y
2Given the Disclosure of Two Non-contractible Performance Measures Under ç
